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COMMUTATION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE: FLORIDA
STEPS BACK FROM JUSTICE AND MERCY
JOSEPH B. SCHIMMEL
I. INTRODUCTION
A DDING a chapter to Florida's long history of death sentence
commutations, the Florida Clemency Board' recently over-
hauled its Rules of Executive Clemency.' Although the Clemency
Board's power to commute death sentences to lesser sentences has
been used sparingly in the recent past, it will likely be used more often
in the future as Florida's death row population expands and more
restrictions are placed upon the use of federal collateral appeals.'
Increased use of the commutation power should be prefaced by a
good look at the power itself. This Comment reviews various state
clemency provisions and the federal judiciary's interpretations of fed-
eral clemency. It also examines the new Rules of Executive Clemency
and their place in the history of Florida's commutation power. Fi-
nally, the Comment suggests changes that would improve the commu-
tation process.
A. Clemency: The Basic Framework
Commutation, along with reprieve, pardon, and amnesty, is a form
of clemency. Clemency has been defined as "an act of grace proceed-
ing from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws [which]
exempts the individual upon whom it is bestowed from all or any part
of the punishment the law inflicts for a crime committed." 4
Unlike a reprieve, which merely postpones the execution of a death
sentence, commutation of a sentence prevents the execution from tak-
I. Consisting of the Governor and Cabinet. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
2. As amended through December 18, 1991. See FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 18 (1992) (ef-
fective dates).
3. From 1890-1910, there was at least one commutation for every three executions; be-
tween 1924 and 1966 there was still better than one commutation for every four executions. See
Vivien M.L. Miller, Murder, Punishment and the State Board of Pardons in Florida, 1890-1910,
at 41 (1990) (unpublished M. Arts thesis, Florida State University); Margaret Vandiver, Race,
Clemency, and Executions in Florida: 1924-1966, at 168 (1983) (unpublished M. Arts thesis,
Florida State University).
4. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 1 (1992).
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ing place at all.' The commutation power is often treated as a subset
of the pardon power. The rationale is that the greater power of par-
doning-exemption from all punishment-includes the lesser power of
commutation-reducing the severity of punishment. The United
States Constitution,6 and many state constitutions7 that grant the
power of commutation, mention only the powers of reprieve and par-
don.
B. The Authority To Grant Clemency
The clemency power may be vested in any branch of government.
Usually, it is given exclusively to the chief executive, although the
power to pardon treason or impeachment is often placed in the legisla-
tive branch.' Some states, including Florida, force the chief executive
to share power with other executive branch members9 or an independ-
ent board, 0 or both." Still others place almost complete control in an
independent agency. 2 -A few even divide control over clemency be-
tween the executive branch and the legislative 3 or judicial branch.14
5. In Florida, the Governor may grant a reprieve not exceeding 60 days, FLA. CONST. art.
IV, § 8(a), but may grant successive reprieves which taken together exceed a period of 60 days.
In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov., 55 So. 865 (Fla. 1911).
6. "The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
7. See KAN. CoNsT. art. I, § 7; MD. CoNsT. art. ii, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7; Miss.
CoNsT. art. V, § 124; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 52; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.M. CoNsT. art. V, §
6; R.I. CoNST. amend. II; TENN. CONST. art. Ill, § 6; VT. CoNsT. ch. I1, § 20.
8, See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cf. 1; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21; ARiz. CONST. art. V, §
5; ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 18; CoLO. CoNsT. art. IV, § 7; HAW. CONST. art. V, § 5; ILL. CONST.
art. V, § 12; IND. CONST. art. V, § 17; IOwA CONST. art. IV, § 16; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 7; Ky.
CONST. § 77; ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 11; MD. CONSr. art. II, § 20; Micn. CONST. art. V, §
14; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 12; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.M. CONST.
art. V, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. 1l1, § 5; OHIo CONST. art. III, § 2; OR.
CONST. art. V, § 14; P.R.. CONST. art. IV, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. III, §
6; VT. CONST. ch. 11, § 20; VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; WASH. CONSr. art. III, §§ 9, II; W. VA.
CONST. art. VIi, § 11; WIS. CONST. art. V, § 6; WYo. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
9. See DEL. CONST. art. VII; FLA. CONSI. art. IV, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 52.
10. Board members are appointed solely to consider applications for clemency. See LA.
CONST. art. IV, § 5 (board appointed by Governor and confirmed by Senate); MASS. CONST. Pt.
2, ch. II, § 1, art. VIII (board appointed by Governor with advice and consent of advisory
committee); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (three board members appointed by Governor, one by
Chief Justice of Supreme Court, and one by Presiding Judge of Court of Criminal Appeals);
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (board appointed by Governor with advice and consent of Senate).
11. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (board includes Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, and
three members appointed by Governor and confirmed by Senate).
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-24a to -30 (West 1985); GA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO
CONST. art. IV, § 7; S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-920 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
13. ALA. CONST. § 124 (Governor may grant reprieve or commutation of death sentence
COMMUTA TION
Controversy arose through the years, however, about who should
hold the clemency power. Alexander Hamilton argued in favor of re-
posing the pardon power in a single person:
As the sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it is
undivided, . . a single man would be most ready to attend to the
force of those motives, which might plead for a mitigation of the
rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which were
calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance."'
While many states, including Florida, have chosen to divide the
power by having the governor share it with a clemency board, this
division is unnecessary. The governor's responsibility for the proper
execution of the laws should be sufficient to prevent him or her from
abusing the pardoning power. The pardoner generally exercises the
power for the public. According to the Florida Constitution, all power
is inherent in the people. 16 The people are the sovereign from which
the efficacy of the power flows.' 7 Although the sovereign pardons
through the governor, "it is none the less the act of the sovereign, and
not the personal act of the Governor."" In his or her capacity as actor
for the people, the governor's duty is to consider and decide on each
request for clemency. 9 As evidence that this duty resides in whomever
is charged with administering the laws of the sovereign,20 it falls to the
only; other clemency power rests with Legislature, which exercises its power through a board
that is appointed by Governor from short list and confirmed by Senate, see ALA. CODE §§ 15-22-
20 to -40 (1975)); MISS. CONST. art. V, § 124 (Governor has full clemency power), art. X, § 225
(Legislature may provide for commutation of sentence of convicts for good behavior); R.I.
CONST. art. VII § 4 (Governor may grant reprieves), amend. 11 (Governor may grant clemency
with consent of Senate). In Utah, the Governor has the power to grant reprieves; other clemency
power is exercised by a board whose composition is determined by statute. UTAH CONST. art.
VII, § 12. Under current law, the board is composed of six members appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-2 (1990).
14. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8 (when applicant has been twice convicted of felony, Governor
may grant clemency only with recommendation of Supreme Court; in other cases, Governor has
exclusive clemency authority); MINN. CONST. art. V, § 7 (clemency power exercised by board
composed of Governor, Attorney General, and Chief Justice of Supreme Court); NEv. CONST.
art. V, § 13 (Governor may grant reprieves), § 14 (clemency power exercised by board composed
of Governor, Attorney General, and Supreme Court); N.D. CONST. art. V, § 6 (clemency power
exercised by board composed of Governor, Attorney General, Chief Justice of Supreme Court,
and two electors appointed by Governor).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTI-
rtTION 16 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
16. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
17. Montgomery v. Cleveland, 98 So. 111, 114 (Miss. 1923).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Exparte Crump, 135 P. 428, 433 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913).
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lieutenant governor in states with constitutional provisions requiring
the lieutenant governor to step into the shoes of governor whenever
the governor is absent from the state.2
C. Exercising the Commutation Power
Because the commutation of a sentence is considered the determina-
tion that the public welfare will be better served by not requiring a
condemned to serve his or her sentence or to be executed,22 the con-
demned's consent is generally not required for commutation of the
sentence.23 The commutation is limited only by the requirement that
the substituted punishment be authorized by law.2 4 However, a com-
mutation may be conditioned upon the condemned's behavior." In
such a case, commutation requires the consent of the prisoner.16
II. COMMUTATION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
A. Justification for Commutation
In his justification for a presidential pardoning power, 7 Alexander
Hamilton expressed the basic rationale underlying the exercise of the
commutation power: "The criminal code of every country partakes so
much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions
in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too
sanguinary and cruel.""1
21. See, e.g., Brown v. Curb, 603 P.2d 1357 (Cal. 1979); Montgomery v. Cleveland, 98 So.
111 (Miss. 1923); Exparte Crump, 135 P. at 433. ("In all regular governments there is no inter-
regnum, and there should always be some one capable of administering the laws at the head of
the government."). Compare CAL. CoNsT. art. V, § 10 ("The Lieutenant Governor shall act as
Governor during the ... absence from the State ... of the Governor" construed by Brown, 603
P.2d 1357) with FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b) (circumstances under which Lieutenant Governor
shall act as Governor; no reference made to absence from the state).
22. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
23. Id. at 486-87; Stone v. Burch, 154 So. 128, 129 (Fla. 1934).
24. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 487. For example, banishment could not be substituted as an alter-
native form of punishment. Instead, a prisoner could be freed on the condition that the prisoner
voluntarily leave the jurisdiction and never return. See, e.g., Ex parte Marks, 28 P. 109 (Cal.
1883) (pardon conditioned on prisoner leaving California and never returning; prisoner was re-
leased but refused to leave the State, and was taken back into custody).
In Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974), the court clarified the phrase "author-
ized by law." The new sentence must be directly related to the public interest and must not
unreasonably infringe upon the fundamental rights of the defendant. Id. at 1236.
25. The sovereignty may attach conditions, precedent or subsequent, on the performance of
commutation. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONiE, COMMENTARIES *394; infra note 80 and accompany-
ing text.
26. A.T.H. Smith, The Prerogative of Mercy, the Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice,
1983 Pua. L. 398, 422-23.
27. See supra note 15.
28. Id.
COMMUTATION
Since the earliest days of the United States, commutations have
played an important role in refining a static and rigid law. 29 Self-de-
fense and youth were recognized as mitigating factors in applying the
pardoning power before they became recognized by the law.30
Recent justifications for the commutation power include state legis-
latures' recognition of the battered spouse syndrome.' In 1991, sev-
eral governors commuted the death sentences of women who had been
severely abused by their victims.3 2 Requests for clemency by victims of
crime have also been heard to justify commutations.3
The exercise of clemency injects a balance into our criminal justice
system that would not otherwise exist. Although the need for individ-
ualized sentencing is well-established,3 4 an abundance of litigation in-
dicates that a perfect system is unattainable. As the power of the
pardon is indispensable for those cases when guilt is uncertain, the
concordant power of commutation is essential for those occasions
when even "the most correct administration of the law by human
tribunals"3 5 inflicts a punishment beyond the deserts of the defendant.
Because clemency is meant to ensure that justice prevails in every
case, even in those that may have slipped through the cracks in our
criminal justice system, it should be viewed as a tool to remedy injus-
tice in particular cases rather than a justification for preventing pun-
ishments with which a governor disagrees or for bestowing acts of
grace.
While the power to pardon ... or commute after conviction for
offenses against the state is a matter of executive discretion, this
29. See 3 HENRY WEIHOFEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SuRvEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 39
(1938).
30. Id. at 39-40.
31. See Texas To Review 200 Abuse Cases: Inmates Could Be Freed in Domestic Slayings,
PALM BEACH POST, May 18, 1991, at 17A (Texas Legislature orders re-examination of domestic
abuse convictions).
32. In February 1991, Maryland's governor commuted the sentences of eight women who
killed abusive men, saying he was convinced the women acted in self defense. Terms Commuted
for 8 Abused Women, Cm. TR-B., Feb. 20, 1991, at A1S; Howard Schneider, Md. To Free
Abused Women; Schaefer Commutes 8 Terms, Citing Violence, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1991, at
Al. In December 1990, Ohio's outgoing governor commuted the sentences of 25 women-in-
cluding all four women on Ohio's death row-who had been convicted of killing or assaulting
husbands or companions whom they said had physically abused them. Alan Johnson, Celeste
Commutes Death Sentences of Eight Killers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 1991, at Al; Isabel
Wilkerson, Ohio Frees 25 Battered Women Who Fought Back, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 22,
1990, at Al.
33. See 3 WEIHOFEN, supra note 29, at 42.
34. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
35. JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITtrrIoN § 1488 (1833), reprinted in 4 TEa
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTON 25, 26 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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discretion should be exercised on public considerations alone. An
undue exercise of the pardoning power is greatly to be deplored. It is
inexcusable.... As an officer [the governor] should look upon the
law as wise and just, whatever may be his private opinion. 6
Although virtually every guilty person could be released under the
guise of the clemency power, overuse of the power is rare because of
its inherent danger. 7 Wholesale commutation of sentences is not
widely practiced, but several governors have taken it upon themselves
to commute every death sentence because of their personal opposition
to the death penalty.38 In admonishing an Oklahoma governor for
such a policy, that state's highest criminal court attempted to convince
the governor of the need for self-restraint:
There is no provision of law in Oklahoma which requires the
Governor to approve a verdict assessing the death penalty before it
can be executed. His duty with reference to such verdicts is negative
and not affirmative. He has nothing whatever to do with them,
unless he may be satisfied that an injustice has been done in an
individual case; then he may commute the sentence or pardon the
offender; but this can only be done upon the ground that, upon the
facts presented, the defendant was a fit subject for executive
clemency, and that an exception should be made in his favor as
against the general rule of law.39 It is not true that when a defendant
is executed according to law the Governor is in any wise responsible
therefor4
The danger of bestowing clemency as an act of grace rather than as
one of pro bono publico is demonstrated by a story involving a south-
ern governor visiting a prison. It is said that in commuting a sentence,
he "walk[ed] down a prison corridor[,] ... stopped, apparently at
random, and pointed to a cell, and that man went free." ' 4' The injus-
tice of this commutation, in the eyes of the public and of the other
prisoners, makes grace an unacceptable justification for exercising the
clemency power. Disturbingly, advocates of clemency as an act of
grace are often in positions of influence over the clemency decision. 42
36. Exparte Crump, 135 P. 428, 431 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913).
37. Henry v. State, 136 P. 982, 989 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913).
38. Id.; Eacret v. Holmes, 333 P.2d 741, 744 (Or. 1958); Solie M. Ringold, The Dynamics
of Executive Clemency, 52 A.B.A. J. 240 (1966); Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency
and the Death Penalty, 21 CATH. U. L. REv. 94 (1971); Brochin, infra note 115.
39. Henry, 136 P. at 988.
40. Id.
41. Kevin Krajick, The Quality of Mercy, 5 CoRaaCos MAo., June 1979, at 49.
42. Raymond Theim, deputy pardon attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, has been quoted as
saying, "Clemency is bestowed as an act of grace, not as a matter of right." Id. at 47-48.
COMMUTATION
B. Abuse of the Clemency Power
When the executive abuses its power of clemency, recourse is lim-
ited. The courts have no authority to inquire into the reasons or mo-
tives behind the exercise of the power and cannot decline to recognize
pardons for an executive's abuse of discretion. 43 Cases discussing the
subject suggest only that the electorate resort to relief at the polls44 or
through impeachment. 4
C. Federal Constitutional Restrictions
As discussed above, few legal constraints attach to the exercise of
the clemency power. Moral opposition and random acts of grace may
offend the public, but they do not offend state constitutions. Still, the
supreme law of the land-the United States Constitution-must be
considered in considering the constitutionality of exercising the com-
mutation power.
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The United States Supreme Court has fully considered and rejected
the claim that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unu-
sual punishment" is implicated by the possibility of death sentence
commutation through executive clemency. 4 1 In Gregg v. Georgia, the
defendant claimed that the arbitrariness which invalidated Georgia's
previous capital punishment system" was still present in the state's
new system, which allowed commutations. Although recognizing that
Georgia's executive could arbitrarily make a decision preventing the
imposition of the death penalty, the Court held that this possibility
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.4 9 Likewise, because the possi-
bility of commutation is only a hope for an ad hoc exercise of clem-
ency, the Court has held that this possibility would not save an
otherwise unconstitutional sentence. 0 Thus, Eighth Amendment con-
cerns in capital cases focus on judicial processes-both trial and ap-
pellate-rather than executive processes."
43. Eacret v. Holmes, 333 P.2d 741, 744 (Or. 1958).
44. Henry v. State, 136 P. 982, 988 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913).
45. Id.; Exparte Crump, 135 P. 428, 431 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913).
46. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
47. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
48. Held violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
49. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
50. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 303.
51. Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1424 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034
(1989).
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2. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that a citizen may not be deprived of a legal right or entitlement with-
out due process of law. 2 Such protected interests may arise from ei-
ther the Due Process Clause itself or the laws of the states." Neither
an interest in a clemency hearing nor a right to receive clemency arises
from the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The states' constitutions do not
provide an accused with the right to have clemency granted. Unless
state law prescribes the grounds for commutation, a governor cannot
be required to explain his or her reasons for refusing to act on a com-
mutation request. 5
Furthermore, the existence of regulations such as the Florida Rules
of Executive Clemency, which are guidelines for the exercise of execu-
tive discretion,56 do not give rise to a constitutionally protected inter-
est.17 A liberty interest will arise only when the regulations are
mandatory and require specific substantive predicates."' The Florida
rules do not limit the discretion of the executive: "[N]othing con-
tained herein can or is intended to limit the authority given to the
Clemency Board." 9
3. Equal Protection
The courts have not yet considered the one constitutional clause
that might be implicated by the exercise of clemency-the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 60 However, this clause would likely be violated if a
governor acted in a blatantly discriminatory manner, such as commut-
ing the death sentences of all inmates of a certain race or gender. Al-
though the courts have consistently held that a governor may grant
clemency to anyone at his or her sole discretion, one hopes they would
make an exception under these circumstances. 6'
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
53. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981); Bundy, 850 F.2d at
1423.
54. Bundy, 850 F.2d at 1423.
55. Id.
56. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEmENCY (1976), superseded by FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY (1992).
57. Bundy, 850 F.2d at 1424.
58. Id.
59. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 2 (1992).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
61. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power
from the King, 69 TEx. L. REv. 569, 617-18 (1991) (Equal Protection Clause might apply to
President's use of clemency powers).
COMMUTATION
1II. THE FLORIDA SCHEME
A. Historical Perspective
The clemency power in Florida has changed radically through the
years. When the territorial government of Florida was established in
1822, the Governor was given powers similar to those of the Presi-
dent:6 2 the power to pardon any offense before or after conviction.
The first Florida Constitution, however, limited that power to par-
dons after conviction only. 63
The next change, during Reconstruction, forced the Governor to
share the clemency power. 64 The Attorney General and justices of the
Florida Supreme Court joined with the Governor to form a Clemency
Board. 61 A majority vote of the Board was required to grant clem-
ency.6 The Governor was required to submit a report to the Legisla-
ture during each regular session showing all pardons given.6 7 The
Legislature was given the right to regulate the manner of applying for
pardons. 68 In 1896, the composition of the Clemency Board was again
changed to include only the Governor and Cabinet. 69
The current Florida Constitution, as revised in 1968, removed the
legislative power of regulating the manner of applying for pardons




62. Compare Act of Mar. 30, 1822, § 2, 3 Stat. 654 (1822) and Act of Mar. 3, 1823, § 2, 3
Stat. 750 (1823) with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
63. FLA. Co sT. of 1838, art. III, § 11. "[A]fter conviction" probably meant after verdict
of guilty, not judgment or sentence. See State ex rel. Barnes v. Garrett, 188 S.W. 58 (Tenn.
1916) (discussing use of the same language in other states).




68. This right did not include the power to regulate the granting of clemency. In 1935 the
Legislature passed a law requiring the Clemency Board to commute any death sentence the Flor-
ida Supreme Court had affirmed by an equally divided vote. Ch. 16810, Laws of Fla. (1935).
The Clemency Board refused to comply, and the Florida Supreme Court struck down the statute
as a violation of Florida's separation of powers clause. Exparte White, 178 So. 876 (Fla. 1938).
69. FLA. CoNsT. of 1885, art. IV, § 12 (amended 1896). This change may have reflected the
view that the body which upheld the legality of a conviction and sentence is poorly placed to
grant relief from the same conviction or sentence. A similar view is often expressed about having
the state's chief law enforcement officer and prosecutor, the attorney general, on the Clemency
Board. For arguments against having the Cabinet share any power with the governor, see Joseph
W. Landers, Jr., The Myth of the Cabinet System: The Need To Restructure Florida's Executive
Branch, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089 (1992); Jon C. Moyle, Why We Should Abolish Florida's
Elected Cabinet, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 591 (1978).
70. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
71. Id.
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B. Powers, Limitations, and Assistance of Counsel
The power to grant clemency in Florida rests exclusively with the
executive branch, 72 specifically, in a Clemency Board composed of the
Governor and members of the Cabinet.73 The Board can grant clem-
ency at any time, before or after conviction, by an affirmative vote of
the Governor and three other members. 74
In Florida, the other branches of government may not interfere
with this clemency power. 7 Therefore, actions of the Clemency Board
and actions taken on its behalf by the Office of Executive Clemency
and the Florida Parole Commission are not subject to section 286.011,
Florida Statutes, the Government-in-the-Sunshine Law;76 chapter 120,
Florida Statutes, the Administrative Procedure Act;77 or chapter 119,
Florida Statutes, the Public Records Law.7 8 In addition, the courts
cannot second-guess the application of the clemency power .79
The Clemency Board may grant clemency without the consent of
the condemned or may impose any condition, limitation, or restriction
that is not illegal, immoral, or impossible on the granting of clem-
ency. When a convict accepts a grant of conditional clemency, the ac-
ceptance is subject to the terms imposed.8 0
The Legislature has authorized appointment of counsel to assist in-
digent defendants in preparing applications for clemency."' A trial
court that renders a judgment imposing the death penalty may ap-
72. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
73. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
74. Id.
75. Sullivan, 348 So. 2d at 314; Singleton v. State, 21 So. 21 (Fla. 1897); see also Exparte
White, 178 So. 876 (Fla. 1938) (discussed supra note 68). Cf. In re Advisory Opinion of the Gov.
Civil Rights, 306 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1975) (statute providing for automatic reinstatement of civil
rights after convicted felon has been discharged from parole or released from custody unconsti-
tutionally invades the authority of the Clemency Board).
76. Turner v. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA), dismissed, 384 So. 2d 1377
(Fla.), affd, 389 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1980) (dictum).
77. In re Advisory Opinion of the Gov., 334 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976).
78. 1986 FLA. ArT'y GEN. ANN. RaP. 114.
79. Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 1986). In Bundy the Florida Supreme Court
also found that courts need not grant a stay while a condemned person prepares and presents an
application for executive clemency when the Clemency Board previously had the opportunity to
determine that the condemned was not and never would be a likely candidate for executive clem-
ency. Id.
80. State ex rel. Bailey v. Mayo, 65 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. 1953). For example, the Clemency
Board could commute a death sentence conditioned on the convict agreeing never to attempt to
escape from prison. If an escape were later made or attempted, then the Board would have the
duty to determine whether or not the convict did or attempted to escape and whether the escape
or attempt constituted a breach of the conditions of the commutation. Advisory Opinion to the
Gov., 23 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. 1945).
81. FLA. STAT. § 925.035(4) (1991).
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point an attorney to represent an indigent defendant who has applied
or wants to apply for commutation of that sentence. 2
As a part of its powers, the Clemency Board promulgates rules "to
assist persons in applying for clemency and to provide guidance to the
members of the Clemency Board." 83
C. Florida's Rules of Executive Clemency
The Florida Clemency Board promulgated the Rules of Executive
Clemency to provide guidance to both the Board and Florida inmates
seeking clemency.8 4 The rules were originally promulgated in 1976, but
have been recently revised. 8 Only particular rules apply to the com-
mutation of death sentences.8 6
Rule 15 replaced old Rule 7 and applies specifically to commutation
of death sentences.8 7 This new rule could substantially affect the oper-
ation of clemency in Florida. 88 Rule 15 allows only the Governor to
begin the process of considering the commutation of a condemned's
sentence,8 9 whereas Rule 7 of the 1976 version provided that the Gov-
ernor or any member of the Cabinet could request an investigation
into factors relevant to commutation. Under Rule 15, after a request
from the Governor, the Commission conducts interviews with the in-
mate (who may have legal counsel present), and, if possible, the vic-
82. Id.; An attorney so appointed is entitled to be compensated for reasonable fees and
costs, paid out of general revenue funds budgeted to the Department of Corrections. See also
Remeta v. State, 559 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1990). Although state law caps the allowed compensation,
the Florida Supreme Court has held that when court-appointed counsel is authorized, "courts
have the authority to exceed statutory fee caps . . . when necessary to ensure effective represen-
tation." id. at 1135.
83. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 2 (1992). The current rules, promulgated in 1991, are signifi-
cantly different from the previous ones. Created after the 1968 amendments to the Florida Con-
stitution stripped from the Legislature the power to regulate clemency, the old rules can be
found as an appendix to Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878
(1977) and as an appendix to the Florida Administrative Code Annotated.
84. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 2 (1992).
85. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY (1976), superseded by FLA. R. EXEc. CLEMENCY (1992).
86. In 1976, Rule 7, entitled, "Commutation of Death Sentences," provided: "[alll Rules
of Executive Clemency are inapplicable to cases of inmates sentenced to death, except Rules 1, 2,
3 and 17." FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 7 (1976). Currently, Rules 1, 2, 3, 15, and 16 (reprinted in
the Appendix to this Comment) apply to cases where inmates are sentenced to death. FLA. R.
EXEC. CLEMENCY 15 (1992).
87. FLA. R. Exac. CLEMENCY 15 (1992).
88. The impact of these changes is elaborated upon infra in the text accompanying notes
152-55.
89. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 15(A) (1992) ("In all cases where the death penalty has been
imposed, the Florida Parole Commission shall conduct a thorough and detailed investigation
into all factors relevant to the issue of clemency ... [upon] written request from the Gover-
nor.'")
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tim's family and the trial attorneys who prosecuted and defended the
case.90 The Commission has ninety days to complete its investigation,
and 120 days from the Governor's request to provide a written report
of its findings to all members of the Board.9'
Although reports, records, and documents generated or obtained
during the investigation are confidential and available only to the
Clemency Board and staff,92 transcripts of any statements or testi-
mony of the condemned that are a part of the Commission's report
are available to the state's attorney, the inmate's attorney, and the
victim's family. 93 Attorneys for both sides and any interested person
may also file a written statement on the case with the Clemency
Board. 94
Once the report is completed, the Clemency Board places the case
on the agenda for its next scheduled meeting. 95 The Board holds regu-
larly scheduled meetings each March, June, September, and Decem-
ber, 96 and any member of the Board may request a special meeting to
consider a particular case. 97 In addition, the Governor has the discre-
tion to place a case on the agenda at any time and set a hearing for the
next scheduled meeting or a specially called meeting.98
At the clemency hearing, attorneys for the State and inmate may
present oral arguments not to exceed fifteen minutes, and a represen-
tative of the victim's family may make an oral statement not exceed-
ing five minutes. 99
The Florida rules do not limit the discretion of the executive:
"[Njothing contained herein can or is intended to limit the authority
given to the Governor or the Cabinet.""' "The Governor has the un-
fettered discretion to deny for any reason any request for clem-
ency."' 01 The rules do not require the Governor to make any factual
findings in order to deny clemency to a capital defendant. 0 2
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at r. 15(E), 16.
93. Id. at r. 15(D).
94. Id.
95. Id. at r. 15(B).
96. Id. at r. 1 I(A).
97. Id. at r. 15(B).
98. Id. at r. 15(C).
99. Id. at r. 15(F).
100. Id. at r. 2.
101. Id. at r. 4.
102. Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1424 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034
(1989).
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D. Execution of the Death Sentence
Death at the hands of the State comes slowly in Florida. The path
from sentence to execution seldom takes less than eight to ten years. 03
After the Florida Supreme Court reviews a death sentence,' °4 the con-
demned initiates a seemingly endless series of habeas corpus appeals.
At any point in the process, the Clemency Board can commute the
sentence of death. 05 At some time determined by the Governor, the
Florida Parole Commission conducts an investigation into all factors
relevant to the issue of clemency. '1 After the investigation, a clem-
ency hearing is held before the Clemency Board.107 Should the Board
refuse to commute the sentence of death, the Governor issues a death
warrant. 08 While the Governor must stay the execution of any person
who is pregnant' 9 or insane," 0 absent these circumstances he or she
must issue the warrant."' If the Governor unjustifiably fails to issue a
warrant, the Department of Legal Affairs may apply to the Florida
Supreme Court for a warrant directing the sentence to be executed. 112
Once the warrant has been issued and absent any successful last-min-
ute appeals, the inmate is executed by electrocution."'
103. Lori Rozsa, Lack of Money Halts Opening of Prison for the Condemned, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Apr. 13, 1992, at Al.
104. As required by FLA. STAT. §§ 921.141(4),.142(5) (1991).
105. See supra text accompanying note 74.
106. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 15(A) (1992).
107. See id. at r. 15(b).
108. FLA. STAT. § 922.09 (1991).
109. Id. § 922.08. The Governor is to stay execution of the sentence until the person is no
longer pregnant. Interestingly, under common law a woman was entitled to a stay for only one
pregnancy. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *387-88.
110. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1991); Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla.) (finding
that placing the determination of sanity with the Governor does not deny due process to the
condemned), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 932 (1984). After the Governor determines that the prisoner
is sane enough to be executed, counsel for the prisoner may move for a stay of execution and a
hearing based on the prisoner's alleged insanity. FLA. R. CRnM. P. 3.811-.812.
In Blackstone's day an insane person could not be executed because "the law knows not but
he might have offered some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed" the execution. 4 BLAcK-
STONE, supra note 25, at *389. Similarly, both section 922.07, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.81 l(b) state that a person is insane for purposes of execution if such
person lacks the mental capacity to understand the fact of the impending execution and the
reason for it.
111.
[T]he Governor's warrant is . .. a negation rather than an affirmation. It is the equiv-
alent of a declaration that he declines to interfere with the execution of the death
sentence, that the law shall take its course, the judgment and conviction be executed
so far as any power vested in him shall be exercised to the contrary.
Jarvis v. Chapman, 159 So. 282, 285 (Fla. 1934).
112. FLA. STAT. § 922.14 (1991).
113. Id. § 922.10.
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IV. JUSTICE AND MERCY IN THE FUTURE: THE ROLE OF THE
EXECUTIVE
The objective of commutation is to promote the public welfare. As
previously explained, 14 the Florida Constitution grants the Executive
power to commute a prisoner's death sentence based on mitigating cir-
cumstances, without judicial review. The power of commutation is in-
tended to promote the cause of justice by ensuring that no one falls
through the cracks in the State's sentencing procedure.
Because the power to grant commutations is intended to be used to
advance justice, the Executive has an obligation to commute sentences
only when justice so requires. The public recognizes that the Executive
has no right to commute sentences at will and without regard to jus-
tice and may respond to sentences commuted in contravention of this
rule by taking action in the next election. Unfortunately, the proce-
dures and philosophy underlying the consideration of commutation in
Florida hardly seem structured to reach what the public will view as a
just result.
Bobby Brochin, special counsel to Florida Governor Lawton Chiles,
spoke about the role of the executive branch in Florida's capital pun-
ishment system at a recent symposium sponsored by the Florida State
University Law Review. '" Brochin included in his presentation several
assertions about Governor Chiles' personal decisions regarding the
proper operation of the death penalty. These assertions have been
considered accurate for purposes of this Comment.' 6 Although Flori-
da's clemency system limits the Governor's ability to commute death
sentences without the concurrence of three Cabinet members, the re-
mainder of this Comment, like Brochin's presentation, will focus on
the considerations the Governor must weigh in considering whether to
grant or deny commutations.
A. Substantive Considerations
1. Current Considerations
In considering a request for commutation, each member of the
Clemency Board makes decisions based upon his or her personal un-
114. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
115. Bobby Brochin, Special Counsel to Florida Governor Lawton Chiles, The Role of the
Executive in the Capital Punishment Process, Address at the Florida State University Law Re-
view Capital Punishment Symposium (Feb. 7, 1992) (videotape available in Florida State Univer-
sity Law Library).
116. However, when Brochin's assertions are relied upon in this Comment, they will be iden-
tified as such.
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derstanding of the purpose of clemency. Therefore, it is important
that each member individually define clemency. Brochin set forth two
contradictory notions of the purpose of clemency.
Initially, Brochin stated that the primary consideration in commut-
ing a death sentence was whether the public interest would be better
served by sparing a life than by taking it. 1' This consideration is gen-
erally noncontroversial.
Brochin later said, however, that clemency is an act of grace, not a
matter of right, and not another form of appellate review. '1 I While the
issue of clemency as a form of appellate review has not been decided
by the courts,"" history has long since rejected the concept of clem-
ency as an act of grace. Implicit in the creation of the clemency power
is the requirement that it be used in the public interest. 20 Therefore,
while the Executive has discretion to grant commutations, he or she
has the obligation to grant them when the public interest requires it.
Clemency thus serves as another check on the capital punishment sys-
tem-one entrusted to the Executive.
Brochin stated that everything should be considered by the Gover-
nor when determining whether clemency should be granted, 2' includ-
ing residual doubts about guilt; new information; whether the
condemned planned the murder; relative guilt and punishment; miti-
gating circumstances, such as duress, coercion, jury override, post-
traumatic stress disorder, or mental retardation; judicial history of the
case; trial judge recommendations; publicity surrounding the case;
and the Governor's personal views on the death penalty.' Brochin
observed that, contrary to the limitations placed on the trial judge re-
sponsible for sentencing, there is no limit to the type and scope of
information the Governor may use in making his or her decision. 23
117. Brochin, supra note 115.
118. Id.
119. Not only is there some indication that clemency is a required part of the capital punish-
ment system, but the Governor himself implicitly recognizes this through what Brochin asserts is
the Governor's refusal to sign a death warrant before considering clemency.
120. See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (D.D.C. 1974).
121. Brochin, supra note 115.
122. See id.; see also Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital
Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 893 n.17 (1981):
Thus, the clemency authority may act out of opposition to capital punishment, Eacret
v. Holmes, 333 P.2d 741, 743 (Or. 1958), even though jurors [opposed to the death
penalty) may be barred from serving in capital cases, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 516-18 (1968), and appellate courts may not act upon such personal feelings,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); .. . (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
123. Brochin, supra note 115.
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2. Recommendations
Brochin omitted several important considerations that should be in-
cluded in the weighing process. The Board should routinely commute
sentences of the elderly who may consume large amounts of money
navigating the current appeals system, and then die before the State
executes the sentence. The death sentence should also be commuted
when racial or other improper motives may have affected the sentenc-
ing decision. Such unacceptable motives have no place in the adminis-
tration of justice, and the remedy of commutation is appropriately
severe. Also, Florida should be leading the nation in bringing atten-
tion to new defenses such as the battered spouse syndrome and post-
traumatic stress disorder, by commuting sentences in such cases. 124
The Board should consider basing clemency on concepts of "poetic
justice"' 25 and "cosmic justice.' ' 2 6 "Poetic justice" refers to an of-
fender becoming the victim of his own crime, for example, by acci-
dentally killing a loved one during the commission of an armed
robbery. In such a situation, the death penalty plus the suffering al-
ready endured by the offender exceeds what is retributively deserved
for the offense.' 27 "Cosmic justice" occurs when the offender suc-
cumbs to the temptation to commit a crime because of unusually ex-
treme circumstances dominating his or her life. '2 In both of these
examples, justice requires that the Board refuse to allow the offender
to incur the additional suffering of death.12 9
The Clemency Board should also consider the impact of an execu-
tion on the condemned's family in making its decision, 3 0 which is just
as relevant as the impact of the crime on the victim's family. It should
also consider commuting a sentence imposed before the issuance of
new case law that would have prevented imposition of the death pen-
alty. 13'
124. On June 9, 1992, the Clemency Board was asked to spare the life of a Vietnam veteran
who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and from the medication intended to help him.
Governor Asked To Spare Veteran, SARASOTA HERA.D-Tium., June 10, 1992, at 6B.
125. Claudia Card, On Mercy, PiL. REv., Apr. 1972, at 182, 201.
126. Id. at 203.
127. Id. at 201.
128. Id. at 203.
129. See id.
130. See James P. Goodrich, The Use and Abuse of the Power To Pardon, 11 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRMINOLOGY 334, 340-41 (1920).
131. New constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applicable to cases which became
final before the new rules were announced. This includes rules governing capital penalty cases,
except rules (1) placing certain kinds of primary, private, individual conduct beyond the power
of the states to proscribe; (2) prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defen-
dants because of their status or offense; or (3) without which the likelihood of an accurate con-
viction is seriously diminished. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 311-13 (1989).
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Finally, the Board should grant conditional commutations when life
imprisonment would serve the same function as the death sentence.
For example, commutation should be granted when it is clear that the
jury's recommendation of death was based upon its belief that the
condemned must be sentenced to death because he or she is likely to
kill again. When the Board recognizes this as the primary considera-
tion in imposing the sentence of death, it should commute the sen-
tence conditional on the inmate leading a peaceful and cooperative life
behind bars.1 2
Brochin implied that such reforms are unnecessary because the
Governor is unable to affect the rate of executions in Florida through
any affirmative act.' In support of this claim, Brochin observed that
although Governor Chiles has signed far fewer death warrants than
his two immediate predecessors, the average number of executions has
remained at two per year. 34 This implication is probably fallacious.
The consistent level of executions is more likely attributed to the ac-
tions of the United States Supreme Court in nullifying all death sen-
tences in 197211 and the delayed execution of sentences resulting from
the current collateral appeals process, rather than the actions of the
Governor. Clearly, the rate of executions will accelerate without inter-
vention. The Governor's job is to act to keep them in check.
In further support of his theory that the Governor cannot affect the
rate of execution in Florida, Brochin'3 6 explained that the Governor's
consent is not statutorily required for executions to take place-the
Department of Legal Affairs may request that the Supreme Court is-
sue death warrants."' Contrary to Brochin's implication, however,
this does not relieve the Governor of the ultimate responsibility for
executing a condemned. 38 According to the Florida Constitution, the
Governor may grant reprieves at any time, even in the face of signed
death warrants. 3 9 Although each reprieve may last no longer than
sixty days,14' the Governor may grant successive reprieves which cover
more than sixty days. 141 Utilizing this power, the Governor may keep a
condemned alive for the entire length of his or her term in office.
132. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
133. Brochin, supra note 115.
134. Id.
135. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
136. See supra text accompanying note 133.
137. FLA. STAT. § 922.14 (1991). Remarkably, this has never occurred.
138. As Hamilton argued it should be. See supra text accompanying note 15.
139. "[T]he governor may , . . grant reprieves not exceeding sixty days." FLA. CONST. art.
IV, § 8(a).
140. Id.
141. In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov., 55 So. 865 (Fla. 1911).
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Therefore, Governor Chiles should not ease his conscience by pre-
tending that the ultimate decision to execute a condemned does not
rest with him. Instead, he should use his public policy platform to set
the tone and direction for capital punishment, to explain to the people
why certain persons should not be put to death, and to educate the
public about the death penalty. If Governor Chiles cannot convince
three Cabinet members that a condemned should not be put to death,
the execution will eventually occur, despite his best efforts. As Bro-
chin observed, the very essence of clemency is political. Therefore, the
Governor cannot hope that commutations and reprieves will go un-
noticed (or unpunished). If the Governor is convinced that his deci-
sion regarding a commutation is proper, he must make every effort to
convince the public.
B. Procedural Considerations
The Governor should ensure that the clemency system is structured
to complement the judicial system and to result in justifiable and reli-
able decisions about commutations. These goals can be accomplished
by (1) shortening the time a condemned spends in the capital punish-
ment system; (2) providing procedures that ensure that the Clemency
Board has access to accurate and complete information about a case;
and (3) convincing the public that the decision was correct. The new
Rules of Executive Clemency should have been drafted with these
goals in mind. To the extent they are not addressed by the rules, the
Governor weakens his or her ability to determine whether the public
interest would be served by sparing the life of a condemned.
1. Shortening the Time a Condemned Spends in the Capital
Punishment System
In any capital punishment system, the condemned stays alive by
keeping his or her appeals alive. Therefore, the condemned usually
waits as long as possible before pursuing collateral appeals and is only
motivated to appeal by the running of the time limit for bringing an
appeal or the signing of his death warrant. 42 Although a death war-
rant is often signed for the sole purpose of forcing a condemned to
pursue an appeal, 43 Governor Chiles will not sign a warrant until
clemency has been considered.144 Because of this practice, many clem-
142. After a death warrant is signed, a condemned has only 30 days within which to file
motions or petitions for posteonviction or collateral relief. FLA. R. CRud. P. 3.851.
143. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Starting from Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of
Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133 (1992).
144. Brochin, supra note 115. Recall that this is a decision not required by positive law.
COMMUTATION
ency hearings are held before the filing of collateral appeals. Gover-
nor Chiles dislikes this system because it means that clemency hearings
consist primarily of procedural complaints that should be heard by the
courts. An inmate's counsel will frequently raise arguments concern-
ing the unfairness of the trial, the incompetence of previous counsel,
and the failure of collateral appeals to remedy these problems.1'4 The
Governor has approached this problem by attempting to delay consid-
eration of clemency until closer to execution, after judicial remedies
have been exhausted. 1
a. Is the Governor's Goal Valid?
Although delaying clemency hearings until after judicial remedies
have been exhausted may eliminate procedural issues from clemency
hearings, there are many disadvantages associated with this approach.
First, significant savings may be achieved by commuting a sentence
before the initiation of a collateral appeal. Millions of dollars are cur-
rently spent on collateral appeals and other procedures involved in the
process of executing an inmate.'4 7 By contrast, the monetary costs as-
sociated with the consideration of clemency are small, consisting of
the expenses of clemency hearings and the interviews associated with
them. 14 8 Of course, the expenses associated with the consideration of
clemency may never be incurred if an inmate is forced to file an ap-
peal prior to a clemency hearing and his or her sentence is reversed
upon appeal. These savings, which would not be realized if the con-
demned is resentenced to death on appeal, are small, however, in
comparison to the chance that obvious injustice will be remedied early
through commutation of a death sentence (or a full pardon).
145. For example: At the clemency hearings on March 10, 1992, the Clemency Board heard
from the counsel of condemned inmate Lawrence Lewis. Lewis' counsel spoke of his recent
appointment and Lewis' difficulty in obtaining counsel for collateral appeals. He read a state-
ment written by Lewis which could have been submitted in writing with equal impact. He also
refused to discuss the specific facts of the case based on his fear that it might jeopardize collat-
eral appeals. Hearing of the Florida Clemency Board, Mar. 10, 1992.
146. This approach is hardly novel. A pre-Furman investigation of clemency procedures
found that every state examined made a conscious effort to schedule hearings reasonably close to
the scheduled date of execution. Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency
in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 152 (1964). The investigation uncovered the practice in
one state, Connecticut, of scheduling the commutation hearings on the morning of the execu-
tion. Id. at 154.
The Governor's other approach-not considered in this Comment-is to reduce the time al-
lowed for collateral appeals.
147. See Rozsa, supra note 103, at Al. ("It costs an average of $3.2 million to execute an
inmate, after fees for attorneys and psychiatrists and other costs are paid.")
148. Even after the first clemency hearing of a case, the Governor may at any time place that
case on the agenda and set a hearing for the next scheduled meeting or at a specially called
meeting of the Clemency Board. FLA. R. Exac. CLaEaCY 15(C) (1992).
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Along with not saving the state any money, delaying the clemency
process beyond collateral appeals does not provide any benefit to the
condemned. Unlike many collateral appeals, clemency hearings may
be held multiple times.' 49 Newly discovered evidence insufficient to
support the claim of actual innocence required for consideration of an
abuse of discretion claim50 could support the commutation of a death
sentence.
What might be the Governor's true motives for delaying the clem-
ency process? A believable, political reason for delay is to avoid the
backlash that follows any death sentence commutation. A governor
who commutes a death sentence is perceived as being "soft on
crime"-a weakness that may be more damaging to a political career
than adultery, sexual harassment, or drug use. When Governor Chiles
sees a case of obvious injustice, he can sit back and wait for the courts
to reverse the unjust conviction or sentence rather than make a deci-
sion on commutation. Should another Board member be allowed to
request an investigation of the case, the Governor faces an undesirable
choice: either join the Board in voting to grant clemency and be held
personally responsible in the next election, or vote against clemency
and leave the inmate unjustly confined to death row. Adopting a phi-
losophy of delaying commutation hearings until the last possible mo-
ment contradicts the Governor's goal of shortening the time a
condemned spends in the capital punishment system, but does explain
why the new rules extend the Parole Commission's time allowance for
investigation and report from ninety to 120 days.'5 '
b. Is the Governor's Solution Tailored To Achieve the Goal?
Governor Chiles has apparently attempted to achieve his goal of de-
laying the consideration of clemency until closer to execution by
promulgating the new Rules of Executive Clemency. According to
Brochin, who participated in drafting the 1992 rules,' new Rule 1511
defers hearings until closer to execution, after judicial remedies have
been exhausted, yet gives the Governor discretion to hold the hearings
at an earlier date. A close comparison of old Rule 7 with new Rule 15
reveals, however, that Rule 15 does not actually defer hearings until
149. Id.
150. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1991) (petitioner cannot obtain federal
review on the merits of an abusive claim unless he demonstrates that the jury would not have
been authorized to sentence him to death), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
151. FIA. R. Exac. CLEMENCY 7(1) (1976); FIA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 15(A) (1992).
152. Brochin, supra note 115.
153. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 15 (1992).
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closer to execution. Old Rule 7 gave the Governor or any member of
the Cabinet the power to request that the Florida Parole and Proba-
tion Commission make an investigation into factors relevant to com-
mutation of a death sentence shortly after it was handed down by the
trial judge and reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court. 5 4 New Rule
15 gives this power exclusively to the Governor and deprives the other
Clemency Board members of the ability to request clemency investiga-
tions. ' Under the new rule, the Governor's goal of considering clem-
ency closer to execution is achievable only if the Governor waits to
request an investigation into commutation until after judicial remedies
have been exhausted. The problem with this strategy is its propensity
to create a waiting game between the Governor and the death row
inmate, with the Governor waiting until the inmate's collateral ap-
peals have been decided before requesting a clemency investigation,
and the inmate waiting to file his appeals until the last possible mo-
ment. Assuming that delaying the consideration of clemency is desira-
ble, it could have been achieved more effectively through alternative
means.
Why was the commutation of death sentences rule changed to pre-
clude Board members from requesting an investigation? Perhaps the
Governor feared that it would lead to premature executions. If it ex-
isted, this fear was unfounded. Allowing Board members to force
early clemency hearings would not lead to premature executions. Un-
der either set of rules, the Governor retained the power to postpone a
condemned's execution. Even if, as possible under the old rules, a
Board member forced the Board to hear a case the Governor believed
was not ripe for review-a determination difficult to reach without a
clemency investigation-the Governor could delay execution by refus-
ing to sign the warrant immediately. In fact, the Governor is not re-
quired to act on a clemency hearing and usually takes death penalty
cases under advisement. Furthermore, without the Governor's acqui-
escence, no execution can take place. 5 6 Even a warrant issued by the
Supreme Court is subject to the Governor's acquiescence because of
his power to grant reprieves.'57
154. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 7A (1976).
155. "The investigation shall begin immediately after the Commission receives a written re-
quest from the Governor and shall be concluded within 90 days of the written request." FLA. R.
ExEc. CLEMENCY 15A (1992).
156. The supreme court must issue a death warrant when the Governor unjustifiably fails to
do so, on application of the Department of Legal Affairs. FLA. STAT. § 922.14 (1991). Even if a
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If the rule change was really intended to prevent Board members
from forcing early clemency hearings, perhaps the Governor disap-
proved of the motivations behind early hearings. Board members may
be motivated to force an early clemency hearing because it may (1)
force the condemned to pursue collateral appeals; (2) quickly remedy
a clearly unjust sentence; (3) prevent the loss of relevant testimony
which results from delay; or (4) bring a case into the public eye for
political reasons. None of these reasons vindicate the change in the
rule. In all cases, the Governor either had the power under the old
rule to thwart the Cabinet member's plans, or the Cabinet member is
able to accomplish his goal without forcing an early clemency hearing.
First, forcing an early clemency hearing would not usually force the
condemned to pursue a collateral appeal. Recall that the condemned is
spurred to appeal by the signing of a death warrant-not by the clem-
ency hearing itself. 5 " If the Governor disapproved of forcing the con-
demned to pursue collateral appeals, and he presumably does not, he
could simply refuse to sign a death warrant. Holding a clemency hear-
ing is merely a prerequisite for signing the warrant, not a catalyst.
Second, the Governor could always prevent the Board from grant-
ing a commutation by exercising what is in essence his veto power.
The Governor has always possessed the power to delay the commuta-
tion of an unjust sentence. Because early clemency hearings could not
remedy injustice without the Governor's assent, opposition to this
motivation does not support the rule change.
Third, even today's public probably supports preventing the loss of
relevant testimony, as the Governor no doubt does.
Finally, preventing early clemency hearings simply will not keep a
case out of the public eye. Members of the Clemency Board do not
need to call a clemency hearing to gain access to the media-any
member may contact the media at any time. Given the secrecy with
which the rules'5 9 surround the commutation process, the process is ill-
suited for embarrassing the Governor by exposing his actions to the
public, should that be the goal of a Cabinet member.
In sum, none of the motivations for early clemency hearings could
or will be thwarted by the rule change. Preventing Clemency Board
members from ordering commutation investigations and hearings has
no discernable rationale.
c. How Should the New Rules Have Been Structured?
What changes would have produced better results than the new
rules? The obvious step, although one not probed in this Comment, is
158. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
159. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
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to press the Legislature to shorten the time allowed for state collateral
appeals. A quicker step is to assure that the Clemency Board is no
longer used as another level of review for procedural complaints. The
Rules of Executive Clemency should explicitly state that no issue
which could still be raised in a collateral appeal may be argued by the
condemned, in writing or at the hearing, and that the Board will not
give any consideration to such matters.lw The rules should require
that the condemned file a statement prior to the hearing explaining
why each issue he or she intends to raise with the Clemency Board
may not be raised on collateral appeal.
The Governor should have few qualms about refusing to consider
issues the condemned has deliberately refused to submit to an appeals
court or will be submitting in the future. Such a rule would speed up
the process more than would shortening the time allowed for state col-
lateral appeals, and would balance the interests of the Clemency
Board in quickly remedying inmates' sentences while remaining free
from procedural complaints. It would also allow the condemned to
argue to the Clemency Board mitigating evidence that may require
commutation despite a lawful sentence and conviction, without wait-
ing for all collateral appeals to be heard.
The condemned should still have sufficient time to tile for habeas
relief after the 120 days required for completing the clemency investi-
gation and report. 61 Otherwise, the condemned has thirty days after a
warrant is signed in which to petition for collateral relief. 162 The Gov-
ernor may always use the reprieve power (except in cases of treason or
impeachment)' 63 or a stay of execution'6 to allow the condemned to
pursue available collateral relief, and any appeal automatically stays
execution. 165
2. Making an Accurate Clemency Determination
Without procedures that ensure access to accurate and complete in-
formation about a case, commutations are poorly suited to promoting
the public interest. The Clemency Board cannot hope to consider
160. Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1991) (rules governing applications for Presidential clemency) ("A
petition for commutation of sentence . .. should be filed only if no other form of relief is
available .... ").
161. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 15(A) (1992).
162. FLA. R. Cghm. P. 3.851. When a death warrant is signed and execution is set for at least
60 days from the date of signing, Rule 3.851 severely limits the condemned's ability to petition
for collateral relief more than 30 days from the date of signing.
163. FLA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 8(a).
164. FLA. STAT. § 922.06 (1991).
165. Id.; id. § 924.14.
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everything unless it is aware of everything. Distressingly, the new rules
do not just fail to strengthen the Board's ability to make an accurate
clemency determination, they actually weaken it. 166
Upon the Governor's request, the Florida Parole Commission in-
vestigates "all factors relevant to the issue of clemency."' ' 67 The new
rules require that the Commission interview not only the inmate, as
required under the old rules, but also, when possible, the victim's
family and the trial attorneys who prosecuted and defended the in-
mate. 16 While the new rules are an improvement, they fail to require
an attempt at contact with one individual who holds valuable infor-
mation-the sentencing judge. The judge may be the best source for
objective information about the case, especially when time has tem-
pered his or her views. 69 Moreover, once the sentence is final, no rea-
son remains not to speak with the judge. However, under the current
rules, the only contact with the sentencing judge occurs after an order
of commutation has been made, when the order is served on the
judge. 70 The rules should, at a minimum, require that the sentencing
judge be notified when a clemency investigation has begun.' 7'
In a step backward, the new rules do not allow the condemned's
attorney access to any part of the Parole Commission's report, except
for statements or testimony by the inmate that are also available to
the victim's family and attorney. 72 By contrast, the old rules kept the
investigative report confidential as far as the public was concerned,
but provided each side's attorney with access to the confidential por-
tions. 7 The effect of the new rules is to prevent the condemned from
learning of and responding to false or misleading statements in the
report.
Any interested person may file a written statement, brief or memo-
randum on the case up to ten days before the clemency hearing. 74
166. The new Rules are discussed supra part III, section C.
167. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 15(A) (1992). Cf. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 7(A) (1976).
168. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 15(A) (1992).
169. Former Arkansas Governor Winthrop Rockefeller posited that dispassionate considera-
tion of a crime, tempered by five or ten years of delay, may actually deter all scheduled execu-
tions. See Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 21 CATE. U. L.
REV. 94, 98 (1971).
170. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 15(G) (1992).
171. James P. Goodrich, past Governor of Indiana, claims that when considering clemency,
he usually asked the sentencing judge and prison officials for their recommendations. James P.
Goodrich, The Use and Abuse of the Power To Pardon, I I J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
oGY 334, 339 (1920).
172. FLA. R. ExEC. CLEMENCY 15(D)-(E), 16 (1992).
173. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENcY 7(B) (1976).
174. FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 15(D) (1992).
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But, again, the statements are kept confidential,' 7 preventing the con-
demned from learning of and responding to false or misleading state-
ments. To allow the condemned to respond to such statements, full
access should be provided to the attorneys on each side, as was per-
mitted under the old rules. 7 6
As discussed earlier, the new rules provide that attorneys for the
State and condemned may present oral arguments at the clemency
hearing not to exceed fifteen minutes 77 while a representative of the
victim's family may make an oral statement not to exceed five min-
utes. 7  These rules take at least two steps backward from the old
rules, rather than a step forward. Under the old rules, each attorney
was allowed thirty minutes, 7 9 rather than fifteen. 80 Clemency hear-
ings only occupy four mornings each year, and even under the old
rules few attorneys exceeded fifteen minutes. Practically speaking,
most attorneys realize that brevity is the surest route to poignancy. In
light of the fact that applicants for all other forms of clemency are
allowed a total of twenty minutes, 8 ' with the possibility of extension
by a member of the Board, 8 2 one must ask just how committed the
Governor and Clemency Board are to hearing the whole story.
Although the new rules allow the victim's family to make an oral
statement-indicating the Board is interested in making better-in-
formed decisions-they still do not allow the condemned to make an
oral statement on his own behalf. While allowing a single representa-
tive from the victim's family to testify provides a benefit only margin-
ally greater than that obtained by allowing written statements of
unlimited length and number, allowing the condemned to testify
would allow members of the Clemency Board to judge the condemned
for themselves-assessing regret in killing an unintended victim, re-
duced mental capacity, trauma, or other relevant factors. Further, the
175. Id. at r. 16.
176. But cf. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331-33 (Fla.) (exposure of Florida
Supreme Court to material withheld from appellant did not taint appellate review), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1000 (1981), cited in Note, supra note 122, at 905 n.84.
177. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 15(F) (1992).
178. Id.
179. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 7(D) (1976).
180. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 15(F) (1992).
181. Florida Rule of Executive Clemency I1(C), which applies to all cases before the Board
except those involving the death sentence. The procedure for death sentence cases is covered in
Rule 15. (Any person making an oral presentation to the Clemency Board is allowed not more
than five minutes, and all persons making oral presentations in favor of an application are al-
lowed cumulatively no more than 20 minutes).
182. Id.
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presence of the condemned would impress upon the Board members
that a real person's life hangs in the balance of their decision. 
1 3
The Clemency Board should not fear that a condemned's presence
would disturb the orderliness of the proceedings. In reality, a con-
demned is probably unlikely to contemplate disturbing the clemency
proceedings because of the danger that the Clemency Board would
simply refuse to grant clemency, no matter how compelling the rea-
sons for mercy. There is more justification for fearing that emotional
victims (in non-death sentence cases) or family members will disturb
the Board's proceedings and prevent it from making a sound decision.
Indeed, allowing victims access at all is a questionable practice.
Brochin' 4 wisely observes that the presence of victims takes the focus
away from the offender and the offense, which may include the cir-
cumstances of the victim's death, and shifts it onto the value of the
victim's life. No doubt the factors Brochin listst""-whether the victim
was an innocent bystander, pregnant, defenseless, a child, a police of-
ficer, or was killed in the presence of a family member-are signifi-
cant and should be considered by the Board because they may
contribute to the heinousness of the homicide. But other factors, such
as the victim's status in the community, friends, or value as a parent
or spouse only serve to discriminate between victims. As Brochin
said, 8 6 in commuting death sentences, we should be demonstrating
our intolerance toward the unlawful taking of any human life, regard-
less of the status of that person.8 7
Non-attorney speakers at clemency hearings (presently the represen-
tative of the victim's family, and, under my proposal the condemned)
should be subject to cross-examination. Cross-examination is neces-
sary to ensure the veracity of those speaking before a tribunal of any
sort. In a clemency hearing, the attorneys for both sides could bring
183. Grounds given for excluding the condemned include (1) the condemned has nothing
personally to contribute which could not be submitted in writing or through counsel; (2) the
presence of the condemned could only create a highly charged atmosphere; and (3) transporting
the condemned to the hearing creates a security problem. Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget,
Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 155 (1964). Of these
grounds, the first two are even more true when allowing the victim's family to testify, which the
rules allow, and the third ground could be solved by holding the hearing at the state prison,
which would force the Board members to make a six-hour trip four times each year.
184. Brochin, supra note 115.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Vivian Berger, Vice Dean of the Columbia University School of Law, presents well the
dangers to victims of allowing victim impact evidence in any context. See Vivian Berger, Payne
And Suffering-A Personal Reflection and A Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
21 (1992).
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to issue the veracity of the reports and statements submitted to the
Board.
3. Convincing the Public
As public opinion clearly disfavors commutation of a sentence,,"8
the Governor must try to sway public opinion to regain the effective-
ness of the commutation power. A good first step would be to require
Clemency Board members to explain publicly why they opposed or
favored clemency. The Governor should open up the process further,
by eliminating the confidentiality protecting records and documents
generated in the clemency process." 9 The rules refer to the sensitive
nature of this information, 190 but the public should wonder about the
nature of information that was not revealed at the original trial and
must not be disclosed to anyone, including the condemned's attorney.
If the Governor and Cabinet found a case suited for commutation,19
revealing the justification for the commutation would be a require-
ment for public acceptance of the action.
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's new Rules of Executive Clemency were not drafted with
the proper goals in mind. At best, they were changed in recognition of
the problems created by an already enlarged death row irrespective of
prospective changes in habeas law. At worst, they were a kowtow to
conservative members of the Clemency Board who wanted to expedite
executions regardless of the cost to human life. Regardless of which
view one accepts, the new rules should be viewed as merely a starting
point in revising the clemency process. In the meantime, Governor
Chiles should not let his personal feelings and philosophies override
considerations of justice, mercy, and the public interest in his exercise
of the clemency power.
188. Which explains why no death sentence has been commuted since the first two years of
Governor Graham's first term. See Brochin, supra note 115.
189. In other words, eliminate Florida Rules of Executive Clemency 15(E) and 16.
190. Id.
191. For the first time in more than a decade. See Brochin, supra note 115.
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APPENDIX
1992 Rules of Executive Clemency applicable to commutation of
death sentences
1. Statement of Policy
Executive Clemency is a power vested in the Governor by the Flor-
ida Constitution of 1968. Article IV, Section 8(a) of the Constitution
provides:
Except in cases of treason and in cases where impeachment results in
conviction, the governor may, by executive order filed with the
secretary of state, suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant
reprieves not exceeding sixty days and, with the approval of three
members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore
civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for
offenses.
Clemency is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the laws and exempts the individual upon whom
it is bestowed from all or any part of the punishment the law inflicts
for a crime committed.
The Governor and members of the Cabinet collectively are the
Clemency Board.
2. Office of Executive Clemency
In order to assist in the orderly and expeditious exercise of this ex-
ecutive power, the Office of Executive Clemency is created to process
those matters of Executive Clemency requiring approval of the Gover-
nor and three members of the Cabinet. These rules are created by mu-
tual consent of the Clemency Board to assist persons in applying for
clemency and to provide guidance to the members of the Clemency
Board; however nothing contained herein can or is intended to limit
the authority given to the Clemency Board in the exercise of its consti-
tutional prerogative.
The Governor with the approval of three members of the Cabinet
shall appoint a Coordinator who shall appoint all assistants. The Co-
ordinator and assistants shall comprise the Office of Executive Clem-
ency. The Coordinator shall keep a proper record of all proceedings,
and shall be the custodian of all records.
3. Parole and Probation
The Clemency Board will not grant or revoke parole or probation,
and such matters will not be entertained by the Clemency Board.
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15. Commutation of Death Sentences
This Rule applies to all cases where the sentence of death has been
imposed. The Rules of Executive Clemency are inapplicable to cases
where inmates are sentenced to death, except Rules 1, 2, 3, 15 and 16.
A. In all cases where the death penalty has been imposed, the Flor-
ida Parole Commission shall conduct a thorough and detailed investi-
gation into all factors relevant to the issue of clemency. The
investigation shall include (1) an interview with the inmate (who may
have legal counsel present) by at least three members of the Commis-
sion; (2) an interview, if possible, with the trial attorneys who prose-
cuted the case and defended the inmate; and (3) an interview, if
possible, with the victim's family. The investigation shall begin imme-
diately after the Commission receives a written request from the Gov-
ernor and shall be concluded within 90 days of the written request.
After the investigation is concluded, the members of the Commission
who personally interviewed the inmate shall prepare and issue a final
report on their findings and conclusions. The report shall include any
statements and transcripts that were obtained during the investigation.
The report shall contain a detailed summary from each member of the
Commission who interviewed the inmate on the issues presented at the
clemency interview. The report shall be forwarded to all members of
the Clemency Board within 120 days of the written request from the
Governor for the investigation.
B. After the report is received by the Clemency Board, the Coordi-
nator shall place the case on the agenda for the next scheduled meet-
ing or at a specially called meeting of the Clemency Board, if, as a
result of the investigation, any member of the Clemency Board re-
quests a hearing within 30 days of receiving the report. Once the hear-
ing is set, notice shall be given to the appropriate state attorney,
attorney for the inmate, and the victim's family.
C. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the Rules of
Executive Clemency, in any case in which the death sentence has been
imposed, the Governor may at any time place the case on the agenda
and set a hearing for the next scheduled meeting or at a specially
called meeting of the Clemency Board.
D. Upon request, a copy of the actual transcript of any statements
or testimony of the inmate that are made part of the report shall be
provided to the state attorney, attorney for the inmate, or victim's
family. The attorney for the state or the inmate, the victim's family,
the inmate, or any other interested person may file a written state-
ment, brief or memorandum on the case up to 10 days prior to the
clemency hearing, copies of which will be distributed to the members
of the Clemency Board. The person filing such written information
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should provide 10 copies to the Coordinator of the Office of Execu-
tive Clemency.
E. Due to the sensitive nature of the information contained in the
report, it shall be confidential. The report shall not be made available
for public inspection or distribution and shall be made available only
to the members of the Clemency Board and their staff to assist in
determining the request for clemency.
F. At the clemency hearing for capital punishment cases, the attor-
neys for the state and the inmate may present oral argument each not
to exceed 15 minutes. A representative of the victim's family may
make an oral statement not to exceed 5 minutes.
G. If a commutation of the death sentence is ordered by the Gover-
nor with the approval of three members of the Clemency Board, the
original order shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and a copy of
the order shall be sent to the inmate, the attorneys for each side, a
representative of the victim's family, the Secretary of the Department
of Corrections and the sentencing judge.
16. Confidentiality of Records and Documents
Due to the nature of the information presented to the Clemency
Board, all records and documents generated and gathered in the clem-
ency process as set forth in the Rules of Executive Clemency are confi-
dential and shall not be made available for inspection to any person
except members of the Clemency Board and their staff. The Governor
has the sole discretion to allow records and documents to be inspected
or copied.
